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0.1.1 Countries that do not Participate
A simple account of globalization would have it that international trade in
today’s world is a club to which all are welcome. True there are numerous, and
scandalous, restrictions on access to rich country markets, particularly where
agriculture and clothing are concerned. Yet over a large range of goods trade
is feasible even on a large scale, as is indicated by the exporting successes of
the Asian tiger countries, and now by China and India. Why then are there
countries and regions that barely participate in merchandise trade, particularly
when primary production is excluded?
This question is particularly pointed in two instances:
• The Arab World
• Sub-Saharan Africa
The UNIDO report on the Arab world notes that the merchanidise exports
of region which is home to close to 300 million people are lower than those
of Denmark. In the present paper I will concentrate on sub-Saharan Africa,
where a similar poor participation in goods trade is observed. See Ng et als.
(2000 and 2002) and Yeats et als. (1996). It goes without saying that the
1causes of poor export performance are many and various. Most of the economies
concerned are in societies that to a greater or less extent are failing. Poor
infra-structures, massive health problems from AIDS to malaria, poor quality
education, the burden of debt, and the sourge of corruption, all drag down
economic performance, and with it possibilities for exports.
This paper adopts a narrower focus than the problem really requires. It
concentrates on those points that are amendable to close-to-standard economic
analysis. Plainly that deﬁnes a limited approach. However it is interesting,
i nm yv i e w ,t os e et h a tm u c hc a nb ea c h i e v e dv i aan a r r o wt r e a t m e n to ft h e
issues. One feature that encourages me to believe that my treatment may not
be worthless is that it appears that a mirror image of my analysis may not be
too bad as a partial account of the success of such a country as China. For
example where I look at overvalued real exchange rates as an drag on exports,
China probably has an undervalued real exchange rate.
If we look at sub-Saharan Africa from a traditional factor availability angle,
as with the HOS model, we see a land-rich resource-rich region that is short
of labour and short of capital. With the help of foreign capital that points
to agricultural exports, and despite heavy protection of that sector in the rich
North, Africa has had some success there. For Kenya and Tanzania a visit to
any supermarket vegetable section will conﬁrm my point.
20.1.2 Non-Tradeables and the Real Exchange Rate
For the time being assume that goods are divided strictly and completely be-
tween tradeable goods that move freely in international trade, and non-tradeable
goods that cannot be traded at all. This has to imply that the quality of traded
goods, if it varies, can be readily and costlessly assessed. We return to that
point later. The non-traded goods may include immobile factors, as in the HOS
model. To keep the argument simple, assume one non-traded good.
A mixed price quantity revenue function can be written:
R[p,x] (1)






gives the shadow price of the non-traded output. Let the price of non-traded
output in international value be q. What happens if q is not equal to (2) when
x takes its optimal value? To be speciﬁc, let that q be far higher than (2). Then
we can write the revenue function in normal form as:
R[p,q] (3)
Full equilibrium obtains when q is ﬂexible. Then the two variables q and U
3are determined by:
p{Rp [p,q] −Ep [p,q,U]} =0 (4)
which is balance of payments equality. Also:
Rq [p,q] − Eq [p,q,U]=0 (5)
is local market clearing for the non-traded good.
With q a pre-determined ﬁxed price the local market for the non-traded good
need not clear.
Eq [p,q,U] ￿= Rq [p,q] (6)
Then U is determined by (4) alone and either buyers or sellers are rationed
in the non-traded goods market. This is the situation as depicted in the Dutch
Disease model,a n di ns o m eIMF adjustment programmes. This last case requires
an inﬂexible price. Then disequilibrium can be the result of nominal exchange
rate mis-valuation.
Theorem 1: In a one-consumer economy mis-alignment of the real exchange
rate q cannot increase utility.
Proof: When equations (4) and (5) are satisﬁed the real exchange rate is not
mis-aligned and there is a standard general equilibrium. Then the allocation is
Pareto optimal, and no other feasible allocation can give the single consumer
greater utility. Normally an exchange rate mis-alignment will lower utility. If
4exchange rate mis-alignment means an allocation that cannot be supported
by any price system, as in (4) and (5), then this allocation must be ineﬃcient.
That follows from the fundamental theorem of welfare economics (every eﬃcient
allocation can be supported by a price system).
An adjustment of the real exchange rate can be brought about by means of
either a nominal exchange rate re-valuation or by alteration of prices of non-
tradeables in the domestic currency. If the second takes place smoothly and
quickly, the second is redundant.
0.1.3 The Political Economy ofthe Real Exchange Rate
Theorem 1 is based on a typical one-consumer argument. With many consumers
the level of the real exchange rate involves conﬂicts of interest, just as with free
trade. Real exchange rate overvaluation is a common phenomenon, particularly
in developing countries. Often one or all of three reasons will help to account
for this:
1. To control inﬂation countries peg their nominal exchange rates to a hard
currency. This does not immediately moderate inﬂation, but if the peg
holds the domestic price level will eventually stabilize at a high relative
level. Then an over-valued real exchange rate is a consequence of inﬂation
control.
2. An over-valued real exchange rate favours some members of the economy
even while it harms others. In particular cheap imports are in the interest
5of many of the westernized urban middle classes, the very people who
tend to enjoy excessive inﬂuence in the imperfect political systems that
are found everywhere.
3. In poor dysfunctional economies the rich often hold their wealth in foreign
currency. When they cannot or do not do that, they will not wish to see
a nominal devaluation reduce the international purchasing power of their
wealth, even if it leads to an improved ﬂow equilibrium. Then the point
made in 2. above applies. Those with an interest in maintaining an over-
valued exchange rate may enjoy a political inﬂuence far in excess of their
numbers.
0.1.4 Semi-Tradeable Goods and Participation
Initially goods are divided between tradeable goods and non-tradeable goods as
before. The home country produces a vector (y0,z),w h e r ey0 are tradeables
before transformation and z are non-tradeables. The concept of transformation
will be explained immediately. We allow now for many non-tradeable goods.
There is a national transformation function:
T [y0,z,y] ≥ 0 (7)
where y are tradeables after transformation. Transformation may take the
form of simple transportation, say to rich country markets. but will also include
quality control and design when these are necessary for export. The point of




T [y0,z,y] ≥ 0 (9)
This gives a reduced-form indirect revenue function for the solution:
R[p,z] ≥ 0 (10)
We call the solution to (8) and (9) that gives the function (10) the centralized
optimal solution. Two questions ﬂow from this analysis.
1. If comparative advantage is deﬁned in terms of autarky prices that diﬀer
from world prices, what is comparative advantage with semi-tradeable
goods?
2. Will a decentralized market system arrive at the centralized optimal solu-
tion?
It is easiest to answer these questions if we assume that transformation
involves separable additive processes.T h e nt h e r ea r en +1functions, where n
is the number of tradeable goods. And (9) is equivalent to:























Even if we look only at the centralized optimal solution it is clear that compara-
tive advantage in a semi-tradeable good does not imply comparative advantage
in its tradeable version, should any such exist. If my wife makes the ﬁnest rasp-
berry jam in the world it does not follow that we can make money by marketing
it. To do so we would need to transform it into a tradeable (marketable) good,
and this might incur prohibitive costs. The point is clear if we imagine that
nearly all goods producible without transformation are non-tradeable. Suppose
for instance that a country produces without transformation only one good that
can be marketed to the world. It might well be a primary product such as baux-
ite. Then in autarky we have no relative prices for any pair of tradeable goods,
and comparative advantage is undeﬁned.
The point is similar to one made by Macarten Humphries in his Oxford M.
Phil. thesis of 2001. He asks whether labour intensive activities are helped
when a labour-abundant country opens up to trade. He argues that the labour-
intensive product may be displaced by a more attractive capital-intensive prod-
8uct. The plastic bucket displaces the local wooden bucket. A few traditional
buckets may be sold to tourists, but this in no way compensates for the fall in
demand caused by the inﬂow of plastic buckets. The home country cannot pro-
duce its own plastic buckets as this requires capital and large-scale production.
How does this discussion confront the claim of many economists in textbooks
and elsewhere that every country must have comparative advantage in some-
thing? This is an extension of Ricardo’s original argument. I return to that
issue below.
Market Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition With non-concave
transformations we cannot guarantee a competitive equilibrium. To examine
participation in an imperfectly competitive context it helps to change the as-
sumptions. Assume that some partially tradeable goods can be sold into foreign
markets under two non-standard conditions.
1. First an overhead cost must be paid purely in the non-tradeable good to
"buy entry" to the world market. This is expressed as a ﬂow. Think of
it as the cost of marketing the good world wide. These costs are diﬀerent
from the overhead production costs of standard IC trade theory, usually
taken to be equal for all producers. The cost will vary across ﬁrms and in
particular will be aﬀected by order of entry.
2. Unlike perfect competition, our ﬁrms are producing goods which are im-
perfect substitutes for similar goods produced in other countries. But
9they are perfect substitutes for the same product produced by any other
national ﬁrm. One chinese saucepan is a perfect substitute for any other
chinese saucepan, regardless of which ﬁrm makes it. At the same time
chinese saucepans are an imperfect substitute for Brazilian saucepans.
These are convenient assumptions, which are plainly not strictly realistic,
but may be good enough to be useful.
We employ the standard Cournot-Nash approach, see Brander and Krugman











x − C0 (13)
where p(..) is the inverse demand curve, X
￿
is total exports by other national
producers, x is the ﬁrm’s own exports, c is constant marginal production cost,
and C0 is overhead costs. The level of C0 does not aﬀect the maximization
(13), but having it there reminds us that the ﬁrm will stay in business only if
maximized (13) is non-negative, and also that C0 m a yv a r yb e t w e e nﬁ r m s .T h e
maximization of (13) requires:
p(X) −c + xp1 (X)=0 (14)























is the elasticity of demand in world markets.









where n is the number of ﬁrms.
Where there is free-entry and n can be treated as a continuous value,a further
equilibrium condition says that the marginal ﬁrm will make zero proﬁt.
X
n
(p − c)=C0 (19)
where C0 is the overhead cost of the marginal (high-cost) producer. Or,
pX − Xc= nC0 (20)
Take (18) ﬁrst and assume for convenience that η is constant. When X
increases p falls and the right-hand side of (18) falls. Then n must rise to preserve
11equality. This is illustrated by the curve PP in Figure 1, drawn linear for
convenience. PP may be taken to stand for proﬁt maximization. What happens
to the left-hand side of (20) when X increases depends upon the elasticity of
demand η. If demand is not too elastic, and certainly if η<1,t h el e f t - h a n d
side of (20) will fall as X increases. In that case n falls as X increases. This is
illustrated by the curve EE in Figure 1, drawn linear for convenience. EE may
be taken to stand for entry-exit.
When C0 is larger it is immediate by inspection of (20) that n will be smaller
given X. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the broken curve E’E’. Then it can
be seen that higher overhead costs - speciﬁcally a higher marginal overhead cost
- lowers the equilibrium values of both X and n. One thing that would raise C0
is an increase in the value of the non-tradeable in terms of tradeables. That is
an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As expected this will reduce exports.
0.1.6 Slaying the Participation Dragon
Whether we use the competitive model, or the imperfect competition model,
the analysis laid out above contains many suggestive ideas that may help to
explain low participation in trade. Goods may be standardized and there may
be no diﬃculties in marketing the product on account of its national origin.
This is the case with many primary products. Even when these vary, as with
particular oils and their sulphur levels, quality control is not a problem and may
in any case be reduced by DFI arrangements. That explains why the export
of primary products, particularly oil, is a relatively easy way to participate in
12international trade.
1. Transport costs are a major problem for trading even standardized prod-
ucts. In such cases getting the product to a seaport may be the main
mechanism by means of which a good is made completely tradeable. These
costs are at their highest for landlocked countries and/or countries with
poor transport infrastructure. Those problems apply with great force in
many African countries. That South Africa is the best trade performer
among the sub-Saharan African countries is unsurprising and is explained
by several factors. One of these is relatively good transport links. How-
ever several poorly performing West-African countries have good ports
but often dreadful road/rail systems. On some implications of space and
transport see Krugman and Venables (1999).
2. The simple analysis above makes it appear that if one ﬁrm can make
a proﬁt from exporting once it pays the overhead cost of market entry,
then it will go ahead. And if a domestic ﬁrm cannot raise the capital, a
multinational can do the job. That is too simple for at least two reasons.
The model has certainty while in reality large risks attach to entering
a market. And the increasing returns implied by a ﬁxed overhead cost
mean that the "toe in the water" approach to entry may stand no chance
of success. The relatively small dispersed populations of many African
countries make a large-scale jump into exporting particularly unattractive.
133. The C0 values are not necessarily constants. They may depend upon
history and upon the participation of other ﬁrms. Once people get the
idea that the Chinese can make quality machine parts, it is far easier for
other Chinese producers to enter the same or similar markets. Then we
may encounter waiting games, as analysed by Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984),
when ﬁrms free-ride to avoid the highest "ﬁrst-in" cost of entry. In sharp
contrast to Africa, China has set the manufacturing band-wagon rolling, so
that more types of products are produced, partly on the back of previous
successes.
0.1.7 Concluding Remarks
A vital aspect of the globalized trading system is the export of non-primary
products from the poor countries of the "South" to the rich industrialized
"North". How did this come about? Three inﬂuences are important:
1. A reduction in protective trade barriers in the North.
2. The removal of gross anti-export distortions in the South, such as controls
and tariﬀs on intermediate inputs.
3. Technical changes in the North that facilitate out-sourcing. For example
motor vehicle assembly is more disaggregated, and techniques have been
developed that make it possible to have Indonesian workers making jeans
to a precise Kalvin Klein speciﬁcation for sale in the US.
14Arguably the third item on above list is of greatest importance. It means
that the problem of surmounting the initial barriers against market access are
dealt with by rich-country buyers rather than poor-country sellers. We go to
a department store and buy a frying pan and we rely on the store and its
reputation to guarantee the quality of the product. That the pan was made in
China does not concern us. This is much the same as the argument of Kaldor
(1949-50) in a sadly neglected paper.
Some small scale economic analysis will never resolve Africa’s trading prob-
lems. At best it oﬀers partial insights. The economic geography of sub-Saharan
Africa is particularly unfriendly to external trade, with huge sparsely-populated
territories, poor transport networks and landlocked countries. That said, the
Arab world including North Africa, mentioned above, does not suﬀer from those
particular problems to the same extent, yet equally does not participate much
in export trade. South Africa is an interesting case in point. Against the back-
ground of sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa appears as a success. Viewed more
broadly its performance is less impressive.
It is unlikely that simply copying success will be the route to success. Even
so, successful examples can be suggestive. The economic miracle in China
started as a coastal phenomenon, and although that is changing it remains
true that the greater part of the industrialization is a seaboard city activity.
How much that might be replicated in Africa is questionable, although South
Africa has most of what is required.
150.1.8 References
References
[1] Bliss, Christopher. and Nalebuﬀ, Barry (1984), "Dragon-slaying and Ball-
room dancing", Journal of Public Economics, December
[2] Brander, Richard and Krugman, Paul (1983), "A Reciprocal Dumping
M o d e lo fI n t e r n a t i o n a lT r a d e " ,Journal of International Economics, 15, 313-
321.
[3] Kaldor, Nicholas (1949-50), "On the Economics of Advertising", Review of
Economic Studies, reprinted in Essays on Value and Distribution, Duck-
worth 1960
[4] Krugman, Paul and Venables, Anthony, with Masa Fujita (1999), The Spa-
tial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade MIT Press
[5] Ng, Francis and Yeats Alexander J. (2000), "On Recent Trade Performance
of Sub-Saharan African Countries: Cause for Hope of More of the Same?",
Africa Region Working Paper N o .7 ,T h eW o r l dB a n k .
[6] Ng, Francis and Yeats Alexander J. (2002), "What can Africa expect from
its Traditional Exports?", Africa Region Working Paper No. 26, The World
Bank.
16[7] Yeats, Alexander J., Amjadi, Azita, Reincke, Ulrich and Ng, Francis (1996),
"What Caused Sub-Saharan Africa’s Marginalization in World Trade?" Fi-
nance and Development, Decembe
17